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Leon Battista Alberti, Mental Rotation, and 
the Origins of Three-Dimensional 
Computer Modeling
Buildings are three-dimensional objects, but architec-tural communication about them occurs primarily in the two-dimensional medium of drawings.1 The use 
of drawings to communicate about buildings goes back to 
ancient times; however, the idea of basing a systematic rela-
tionship between a building’s shape and its two-dimensional 
representations on quantification is much more recent. 
 Systematic here refers to the assumption that a complete 
 two-dimensional visual representation (for instance, a set of 
drawings) of a three-dimensional object can be formulated 
by means of a clearly defined and consistently applied math-
ematical procedure. This procedure may be, for instance, a 
perspectival or orthogonal projection, but it must be consis-
tently applicable: once the shape of the object is known, one 
should be able to produce its two-dimensional representa-
tions from any given side. The procedure must also enable 
one to depict the complete shape of the three-dimensional 
object using a set of two-dimensional representations—the 
way, for instance, modern three-dimensional computer mod-
eling enables one to “rotate” the shape of an object on a 
computer screen. Finally, the procedure must not be mis-
leading. The resulting representations must not suggest the 
existence of things they are not meant to represent—all 
points and lines in a drawing must be representations of their 
spatial equivalents. There should be no point or line in a 
drawing that does not represent some point or line in the 
spatial disposition of objects (real or imaginary) that the 
drawing represents. Fifty years ago, architecture schools 
taught descriptive geometry as the mathematical discipline 
that enabled architects to achieve such systematic represen-
tations, resolve difficult spatial relationships between ele-
ments, and develop their ability to visualize the buildings 
and spaces they designed. Presumably, modern three- 
dimensional computer modeling, which relies on the same 
assumption that quantification can guarantee the consistency 
and completeness of two-dimensional representations of 
three-dimensional shapes, has made this training obsolete.
In this article I will consider the first theoretical articula-
tion of the idea of a systematic and consistent representation 
of three-dimensional shapes in a two-dimensional medium 
in the history of architecture. It should not be surprising that 
Leon Battista Alberti was the first to formulate the idea—or 
that his formulation cuts deep in some of the central assump-
tions that architects necessarily make about space as the 
medium in which they operate.
Mental Rotation 1
I will start by considering the best-known case of noncom-
puter three-dimensional modeling, mental rotation. Being 
able to see an object on a computer screen from different 
sides—to rotate the object—clearly parallels imagining an 
object from different sides, the procedure that psychologists 
call “mental rotation.” In other words, a picture on a com-
puter screen can show an object only from a single side; one 
needs a series of images that show the object from different 
sides in order to be able to describe its three-dimensional 
properties—which is equivalent to imagining the object from 
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different sides in one’s mind. Modern computers perform 
this task faster and with greater accuracy than the human 
brain, but the principle is the same: the shape of an object is 
represented by means of two-dimensional visual images. 
These images show what the object looks like from different 
sides. This information defines the object’s shape; one is able 
to grasp a building’s spatial properties by considering the 
building’s appearance from different sides. It is assumed that 
the geometrical properties of the building can be conveyed 
fully and unequivocally by means of visual images—that the 
geometry of visual perception can guarantee accurate 
 communication about the geometry of physical objects.2 
(Conveying the way a building smells from different sides 
will not get us very far; the same applies to other senses as 
well, and even the sense of touch is of little use when it comes 
to large or complex objects.) When considering an object’s 
shape, one does not think by means of scripts or the equa-
tions of analytic geometry that can be used to define the 
object’s shape. Rather, when such nonvisual representations 
are involved, one has to think in terms of their visual inter-
pretation in order to establish what the object would be 
like spatially.
Thinking about the three-dimensional properties of 
objects ultimately consists in imagining them visually from 
various sides. The procedure fundamentally relies on the fact 
that the limits of human visual imagination coincide with the 
limits of Euclidean geometry. One can visually imagine a 
centaur or a physically impossible event, but one cannot visu-
alize a geometrically impossible object, such as a pentagonal 
square or two points connected with more than one 
straight line. In this sense, too, mental and computer three-
dimensional modeling are similar: no three-dimensional 
modeling software makes it possible to visualize on the 
screen a sphere whose intersection with a plane is a hexagon. 
There are good reasons for this. A non-Euclidean room may 
have, for instance, an infinite number of ceilings, all parallel to 
and equidistant from the floor. No builder could build it, and 
the number of clients who would need a computer model of 
such a room is unlikely to motivate commercial software firms.
It is much harder to explain why human visual imagina-
tion is subject to Euclidean geometry.3 Visual imagination 
and mental rotation became serious topics of psychological 
research in the 1970s. In an experiment that has become 
famous, Roger Shepard presented subjects with images of 
similar spatial figures (Figure 1).4 The subjects were asked to 
determine in which cases the images showed different com-
positions of cubes and in which cases they showed the same 
compositions rotated (seen at different angles). Most subjects 
solved these problems without difficulty, but for Shepard’s 
team the important point was how much time the subjects 
needed to respond. It turned out that the amount of time 
needed was directly proportional to the angle of rotation. 
The subjects needed twice as much time to respond to an 
image rotated by 120 degrees as they did for one rotated by 
60 degrees. They also reported that they solved the problems 
by rotating the objects in their imaginations.5
The important aspect of mental rotation—the one care-
fully imitated by various computer programs for three-
dimensional computer modeling—is that it cannot yield a 
geometrically impossible result. Ultimately, our implicit 
knowledge of geometry enables us to imagine what a thing 
looks like from different sides; without our implicit assump-
tions about the geometrical properties of spatial objects we 
would not be able to perform mental rotation. But is this 
knowledge acquired or inborn? In three-dimensional model-
ing programs it is built into the software. About four decades 
ago, Stephen Kosslyn suggested that geometry is constitutive 
of the medium in which human visual imagination operates. 
He proposed treating visual imagination as equivalent to the 
cathode-ray tube (CRT) display used in the television sets of 
that time.6 Obviously, Kosslyn was not suggesting that peo-
ple have TVs in their heads; rather, he was asserting that 
human visual imagination is comparable to a TV screen. 
In other words, when images represent spatial objects, the 
Figure 1 Roger Shepard used drawings like these to test mental 
rotation (technical preparation of drawing by Peter McPherson).
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spatial properties of such objects (such as their dimensions) 
are encoded and represented in the same way as are the rep-
resentations underlying the experience of seeing during per-
ception.7 This heuristic metaphor (the “CRT model”) 
enabled Kosslyn’s team to formulate a series of hypotheses 
that they tested experimentally with success.8 Typical experi-
ments involved measuring the time subjects needed to “scan” 
various images in their imaginations.9 Kosslyn endeavored 
to show that visual imagination is a genuine mode of thinking 
and not a mere by-product of more abstract, nonpictorial 
mental processing. (Arguably, the latter is the case with the 
rotation of a spatial object on a computer screen: what we see 
on the screen is but an external manifestation of the mathe-
matical operations performed by the computer’s processor.) 
If Kosslyn is right and our incapacity to visualize geometri-
cally impossible spatial relationships derives from the visual 
medium in which we think spatially, then this incapacity 
could be inborn, hardwired.
Kosslyn’s CRT model was criticized by Zenon Pylyshyn.10 
In Pylyshyn’s view, Kosslyn’s experiments seemed to confirm 
the CRT model because the subjects’ responses followed 
their tacit knowledge about the way human vision functions, 
not because the CRT model accurately described the nature 
of the (presumably hardwired) medium in which visual imag-
ination occurs. “Tacit knowledge” consists of the assump-
tions an individual implicitly makes when solving a problem; 
very often it is neither conscious nor explicitly articulated. 
For instance, Pylyshyn argued, imagine a transparent yellow 
filter and a transparent blue filter side by side. Then imagine 
moving them slowly so that one crosses over the other. What 
color do you imagine you see through the two superimposed 
filters? The answer is green, but this is because we assume 
that green is seen when blue and yellow filters are superim-
posed on each other. Pylyshyn’s example suggests that we 
acquire our tacit knowledge through experience and learn-
ing; it is unlikely that our knowledge of the physical laws that 
determine the colors seen through light filters is inborn. 
However, this argument is much more convincing in regard 
to imagining physical processes than it is in the case of the 
geometrical properties of things (such as three-dimensional 
shapes). With physical events, our implicit beliefs indeed 
determine what we imagine: in the example of light filters, 
it is possible to assume that the blue and yellow filters are 
some special kind that make one see red when they are super-
imposed—and then to imagine seeing red through them. 
When our tacit assumptions about physical processes change, 
the way we imagine physical events changes as well. But this 
does not apply to the geometrical properties of things: what-
ever I know or believe, I cannot imagine two points con-
nected by more than one straight line. I cannot decide to 
imagine a special kind of sphere whose intersection with a 
plane is a triangle.
Kosslyn and Pylyshyn both attempted to explain the 
results of Shepard’s experiments in the postbehaviorist era. 
In their time, Shepard’s experiments contributed significantly 
to the demise of behaviorist psychology. Notoriously, in the 
preceding decades, behaviorism in American psychology had 
dismissed research about visual imagination as unscientific. 
Shepard managed to show that quantifiable experimental 
research about human visual imagination is possible. It is 
therefore not surprising that in the popular media Shepard’s 
experiments are sometimes celebrated as the “discovery” of 
mental rotation.11 This claim is certainly inappropriate, since 
architects have known about mental rotation for a very long 
time. The discipline of descriptive geometry, which has 
been in use for centuries to formalize relationships among 
plans, sections, and elevations, fundamentally relies on the 
human ability to visualize objects from different sides. 
A drawing such as the one reproduced here from Andrea 
Palladio’s 1570 treatise I quattro libri dell’architettura 
would be incomprehensible if we were not able to under-
stand it as a representation of one architectural detail shown 
from different sides (Figure 2). The assumption is that a set 
of drawings like this one provides the human mind with 
information that is sufficient for the viewer to form a 
three-dimensional mental model of the detail described, 
otherwise stonemasons would not be able to produce the 
details of the Ionic order.
Note the geometry that underlines the organization of 
the drawing: the planes and lines that would coincide in 
three-dimensional space are carefully aligned. The geo-
metrical consistency of the spatial properties of objects is 
reflected in the consistent geometrical organization of 
their depiction. The geometrical consistency of the three-
dimensional mental model (e.g., in the architect’s mind) is 
reflected in a consistent system of geometrical transforma-
tions that define the organization of the drawing. The fact 
that our visual imagination (and the mental rotations that it 
enables) necessarily operates according to Euclidean geometry 
means that geometry must underlie our every attempt to use 
imagination to think visually about the spatial properties 
of objects. Because it is impossible to achieve high levels 
of geometrical precision in imagination, the architect is 
forced to resolve and define on paper, using geometrical 
construction, the specific relationships among various 
shapes, sizes, and distances. Such geometrical resolutions 
are achievable because it is possible to articulate the prob-
lem mentally, in imagination. We still have to imagine 
visually the dispositions of geometrical bodies in order to 
solve geometrically, with precision, problems pertaining 
to their spatial relationships.12 Ultimately, the capacity to 
think spatially using visual imagination enables us to 
 produce, understand, and use geometrically consistent 
two-dimensional representations of three-dimensional 
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objects because the geometry of visual imagination is the 
same as the geometry of architectural space. The question 
is, when did the geometry of space start to guarantee 
the validity of visual representations in architectural 
communication?
Alberti and the Geometry of Architectural Works
More than a century before Palladio published his drawing, 
Leon Battista Alberti wrote that a work of architecture “con-
sists of lineaments and matter.”13 Interpretive debates about 
the meaning of Alberti’s technical term lineamenta started as 
early as the sixteenth century.14 The word occurs 
ninety-three times in Alberti’s architectural treatise. In all its 
occurrences, it can be translated into English as “shape,” and 
it is generally clear that Alberti meant something like “shape 
as (geometrically) defined by lines.”15 In the opening of the 
first book of his treatise Alberti directly explained that linea-
ments are immaterial and that we perceive the same linea-
ments on different buildings when we perceive that individual 
parts, their placement, and their order mutually correspond 
in all angles and lines.16 Similarly, in De statua Alberti 
described instruments that one can use to copy sculptures by 
measuring their shapes and reproducing “the lineaments and 
the position and collocation of parts.”17
Like the English word shape, lineamenta may refer to the 
shape imagined in the mind of the architect, the shape 
Figure 2 Detail of the Ionic order (Andrea 
Palladio, I quattro libri dell’architettura [Venice: 
Domenico de Franceschi, 1570], 34; Collection 
Centre Canadien d’Architecture/Canadian Centre 
for Architecture, Montreal).
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 represented by means of drawings (models), or the shape of 
a physical building.18 A well-known Aristotelian principle 
says that (the content of  ) knowledge is identical with its 
object; in this case, lineamenta would be the content of the 
architect’s thoughts, a property of a physical building, 
and that which is communicated by means of drawings.19 
A physical building, as mentioned, thus consists of linea-
ments and matter. Lineamenta are also purely mental, the 
content of an architect’s idea. Alberti wrote that a lineament 
is a definite and constant description (perscriptio), conceived 
and perfected by the rational soul and the learned ingenium.20 
Perscriptio is another of Alberti’s technical terms. The noun 
and its related verb perscribere occur sixteen times in De re 
aedificatoria.21 Standard Latin dictionaries recommend trans-
lating them as referring to verbal rather than visual descrip-
tions; nevertheless, except for three occurrences, Alberti in 
De re aedificatoria used the term to refer to visual descriptions 
of formal properties. We thus read about perscriptiones of geo-
metrical figures, parts of buildings, and fossils as represen-
tations of the shapes of animals.22 Out of eleven contexts in 
which Alberti used perscriptio to refer to a visual description, 
in seven he directly implied that this description was two-
dimensional, while the remaining four contexts allow for 
such interpretation (though they do not necessarily imply 
it). Alberti directly contrasted the perscriptio of a building 
with its model because of the former’s two-dimensionality.23 
The textual evidence thus suggests interpreting perscrip-
tiones as two-dimensional mental representations. 
 Alberti’s referring to perscriptiones as mental images is a 
quattrocento equivalent of Kosslyn’s CRT model, a men-
tal equivalent of representation on a two-dimensional 
TV screen.
Ontologically, for Alberti, what an architect makes is 
mental content that is conveyed to workers by means of 
drawings and materialized in executed buildings. Mario 
Carpo, who uses the modern English word design for this 
mental content, observes that “in Alberti’s theory, the design 
of a building is the original, and the buildings are its copy.” 
He adds, “Alberti’s design process relies on a system of nota-
tion whereby all aspects of a building must be scripted by one 
author and unambiguously understood by all builders.” 24 
Alberti indeed assumed strong separation between the archi-
tect as the author who determines the immaterial lineaments 
or shapes of the building, a job that is performed in the mind, 
and the hand of the artisan that imposes these shapes on 
 matter.25 His statement in the preface to De re aedificatoria 
that a building consists of lineaments and matter would have 
been immediately recognized by his contemporaries as a 
departure from the fundamental Aristotelian thesis that a 
material object consists of form and matter.26 Forma in the 
Latin Aristotelianism of his time is a rendering of Greek 
eidos: it is not the shape of an object but its essence, the 
what-it-is-to-be-that-thing.27 For instance, the essence of a 
dog is the dogness that it shares with other dogs, not its 
shape, which can vary. Aristotelian essence, morphe in 
Greek and forma in Latin, is instantiated in a thing as its 
nature; Albertian lineamentum is instantiated in a thing 
as its shape. For Alberti, two buildings share the same lin-
eaments if they have the same lines and angles.28 The 
instantiation of the shape conceived by the architect is 
comparable to the instantiation of Aristotelian essence in 
matter; it is achieved by the hand of the craftsman, and if 
collaboration between architect and craftsman is going to 
be possible, the mental capacities of both must enable it. It 
is therefore fair to ask about the way the mental processes 
that enable such collaboration, thinking and communicat-
ing about spatial objects, would have been conceived of in 
Alberti’s time.
Imagination in Aristotelian Psychology
Alberti could not have read twentieth-century research on 
visual mental imagery, but Aristotelian psychology of his 
time would have provided him with ample support for a 
theory of perscriptiones as two-dimensional mental represen-
tations of three-dimensional objects. Renaissance psycho-
logy was based almost exclusively on the interpretation of 
and commentary on Aristotle’s De anima. Aristotle’s treatise 
not only had a huge circulation, additionally strengthened by 
the religious importance of questions about the immortality 
of the soul, but it was also mandatory reading in almost all 
European universities during the Renaissance.29 In fact, at 
the time there was no alternative description of human 
 cognition and mental capacities. Aristotelians or not, Renais-
sance thinkers had to rely on the classification of these capac-
ities presented in Aristotle’s De anima.
Imagination—and visual imagination in particular—plays 
a central role in Aristotle’s description of human cognition.30 
Contrary to some twentieth-century philosophers who 
insisted that there can be no thinking without language, 
 Aristotle insisted that there can be no thinking without imag-
ination.31 In De anima he describes the way the percepts 
received by the external senses (seeing, hearing, and so on) 
are first assembled in common sense—“common” because it 
combines the information received from various external 
senses. Common sense formulates, for instance, the aware-
ness that the white substance I see is also sweet.32 Together 
with memory, common sense enables imagination to form 
the representations of external objects called phantasms.33 It is 
from the phantasm that the intellect subsequently extracts 
the essence of the object—that is, recognizes what the thing is.34 
The nature of phantasms is described in greater detail in 
De memoria than in De anima, since the latter treatise is 
mainly concerned with differentiating between the imagination 
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and other capacities of the soul.35 In De memoria Aristotle 
says that the affection produced by sensation in the soul 
is a picture (zographema) and that it is like an image (typos) of 
the thing perceived; perception is comparable to the impres-
sion of a signet ring into wax.36 In the next paragraph 
he starts his explanation of the intentionality of mental visual 
representations by saying, “Assuming that there is in us 
something like an image [typos] or a drawing [graphe].”37 
Since the standard translation of zographema is “picture” and 
that of graphe is “drawing,” the implication is that phantasms 
are two-dimensional representations. It may be argued that 
the term typos, “imprint,” suggests three-dimensionality 
because of the reference to the impression of a signet ring 
into wax. (Alternatively, it is plausible that Aristotle is talking 
about imprinting merely in order to describe how such 
 representations come about.) But even if typos is understood 
three-dimensionally, as a kind of relief, when it comes to the 
representation of architectural works, such reliefs would 
function in the same way as two-dimensional representa-
tions: a set of such representations, showing the object from 
different sides, would be needed to represent the three-
dimensional shape of a building. One would still encounter 
the same problems that result from the need to define geo-
metrically the relationship between a three-dimensional 
shape and a set of drawings depicting it. De memoria would 
have been available to Alberti in a medieval translation by 
James of  Venice that also emphasizes the two-dimensionality 
of phantasms.38 In the medieval Latin rendering it is figura 
that is imprinted into wax, while the second sentence cited 
above discusses figura and pictura.39 Figura could be under-
stood as three-dimensional, but, as mentioned, this three-
dimensionality is the three-dimensionality of a relief; pictura 
is definitely two-dimensional. Alberti’s understanding of per-
scriptiones as two-dimensional representations thus fits well 
in the mainstream of Renaissance Aristotelian psychology.
Geometrical Consistency of Two-Dimensional 
Representations
This is, however, also the point at which Alberti departs from 
Aristotle. Even in the writings that preceded De re aedificatoria 
he followed the long tradition of Greek, Arab, and medieval 
optical theorists rather than the Aristotelian account of 
human visuality. There were indeed good reasons to avoid 
Aristotle’s account of human vision. In Aristotle’s view, light 
is the actualization of the medium of vision—which pre-
cludes the existence of light rays that travel in straight lines.40 
The problem with this view is that it makes it impossible to 
explain why we perceive things where they are, their relative 
positions, and their spatial relationships to each other. For 
instance, if a chair is to the left of a table, I perceive it there 
because the light rays that reach my eyes from the chair 
arrive from a position to the left of that from which the light 
rays from the table reach my eyes. For this explanation to 
work, one must postulate straight light rays traveling from 
the object to the eye. But Aristotle’s explanation leaves no 
space for light rays—and, as a result, Aristotelian optics de 
facto cannot explain why things are perceived where they 
are.41 There is nothing in Aristotle’s account that would 
ensure that I perceive the chair to the left of the table, if it is 
really there. Such a theory of vision is certainly unsatisfactory, 
especially for Alberti, who concentrated his efforts on defin-
ing a geometry-based pictorial account of the shapes and 
spatial distances between objects. In classical antiquity, we 
find a comprehensive mathematical treatment of human 
vision in Euclid’s Optics.42 Starting from the assumption that 
light rays are straight lines, Euclid described how the 
 perceived size of an object (the size of its visual angle) 
depends on its distance from the viewer.43 This was basically 
the geometrical version of the central problem that the early 
Renaissance theorists of perspective endeavored to resolve: 
the relationship between the distance of an object from the 
viewer and the object’s perceived size. However, Euclid, as a 
mathematician, never contemplated, and was probably not 
interested in, the implications of his theorems for the visual 
depiction of objects by means of drawings. He mathemati-
cally articulated the way the perceived size of an object 
changes with distance, but he did not bother to ask how his 
mathematical description could be applied in drawing.44 
In simple words, Aristotle talked about images but conceived 
of them as independent of the geometry of light; Euclid 
described the geometry of light but had no interest in images.
The pictorial application of the geometry of human visu-
ality to visual representations is Alberti’s important topic in 
De pictura. The starting point of his account is the observa-
tion that every surface can be defined through the specifica-
tion of the size, position, and length of lines.45 The statement 
directly contradicts Aristotle’s view that we primarily 
 perceive colors and, consequently, surfaces.46 For Alberti, 
surfaces are defined by lines.47 He then proceeds by observ-
ing that light rays travel in straight lines; since they connect 
the eye and the object, the perception of every line on the 
object can be analyzed geometrically—it can be defined by 
means of a triangle whose base is the line mentioned and the 
opposing point of which is the human eye.48 Taken together, 
such triangles make up the pyramid of sight.49 This reason-
ing implies that the totality of human visual experience can 
be described geometrically. A picture is a section through the 
pyramid of sight—it is a plane that shows what we would see 
through a window located at the place of the picture plane.50 
In other words, there is the eye and there is the object 
depicted in perspective; the light rays that reach the eye from 
the object travel in straight lines. One could place a window 
between the object and the eye and draw on the glass the 
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object as one sees it through the glass. Perspective is the 
procedure that generates the same drawing by geometric 
means. A perspectival drawing therefore delivers to the eye 
a bundle of light rays equivalent to the one that would reach 
the eye from the depicted object. Thus understood, perspec-
tival geometry describes the totality of visuospatial percep-
tual experience. In the little essay Elementa picturae Alberti 
states that there is nothing in nature that can be perceived by 
the eyes and yet not represented in lines.51 At the same time, 
the geometrical procedure for the construction of perspec-
tive drawings that he describes can represent any shape from 
any side, and it does not allow that there could be a part of a 
drawing that would not geometrically define something in 
the disposition of objects depicted. As Ernst Gombrich 
has pointed out, “The first consequence of the [Albertian] 
window idea is that we cannot conceive of any spot on the 
panel which is not significant, which does not represent 
something.”52 This corresponds to the idea of systematic 
two-dimensional representations of three-dimensional 
objects (whose completeness and consistency are enabled by 
the mathematical procedures that define them) described in 
the opening of this article.
The central point of Alberti’s writings about the visual arts 
is the quantification of spatial relationships and visual experi-
ence; De pictura, De statua, Elementa picturae, and Descriptio 
urbis Romae de facto all endeavor to show that there are 
no spatial relationships that cannot be arithmetically or 
 geometrically compared.53 According to De pictura, light 
guarantees the geometrical nature of human vision: light 
rays, which make human visual experience possible, are the 
equivalents of straight lines. Ultimately, those properties that 
define lineaments are the same properties (the shapes of 
buildings) that are depicted using light rays. The geometry 
of physical shapes is translatable fully and without residue 
into the geometry of two-dimensional visual representations, 
perscriptiones drawn or imagined. De pictura is mainly con-
cerned with the geometrical construction of perspectival 
perscriptiones, but there is ultimately no reason plans, sections, 
or elevations would be excluded. Alberti’s important point is 
that all visible properties of objects are geometrically defin-
able as sets of lines; the sets of lines that define the shape of 
an object are its lineaments, and a building consists of linea-
ments and matter. The geometry of light rays guarantees the 
geometry of two-dimensional representations of three-
dimensional objects. We have seen that this would not work 
with Aristotelian understanding of light—and one can simi-
larly compare Alberti’s understanding of human vision with 
the theory presented in Lucretius’s De rerum natura, which 
became available in Florence as a result of Poggio Bracciolini’s 
discovery in 1417.54 According to Lucretius, objects con-
stantly emit their own images (simulacra), which are like 
membranes drawn from their outermost surfaces that move 
swiftly through the air.55 They are broken when they run into 
wood or rocks; they pass through glass and are reflected by 
mirrors.56 The theory leaves unclear how we can perceive the 
distance between objects (which is immaterial and therefore 
emits no image) and leaves no possibility for a quantified 
description of visual space, such as perspective. Alberti’s 
 perscriptiones, however, are definable by means of the geom-
etry of light rays—and since they are two-dimensional, we 
need more than one of them to depict a three-dimensional 
object from all its sides. To achieve this, we need to rotate the 
object in our minds or using drawings, the way most archi-
tects today would on a computer screen. So we are back to 
mental rotation.
Mental Rotation 2
The nature of the cognitive processes that enable mental 
rotation was Alberti’s additional difficulty with Aristotelian 
psychology. On one hand, he had reason to endorse Aristotle’s 
account of the importance of visual imagination—his 
 perscriptiones are close approximations of Aristotle’s phantas-
mata, and at the time there was no alternative cognitive 
 psychology to explain visual imagination anyway. We have 
seen that for Aristotle, the lower, material, and perishable 
strata of the human soul consisted of the five external senses 
(vision, smell, hearing, taste, and touch) and the internal 
senses (the common sense, imagination, and memory) that 
processed the information received through the external 
senses. In the debate between Kosslyn and Pylyshyn, Aristot-
 le would side with Kosslyn, given that in De memoria he 
explicitly states that the products of imagination, phantasms, 
are stored in memory.57 In other words, our memory stores 
two-dimensional images as two-dimensional images—it does 
not encode them in some other way. For Aristotle, there is 
no thinking without imagination. Unlike Pylyshyn, he does 
not conceive of imagination as a mere by-product of more 
abstract, nonpictorial mental processing. It is from phan-
tasms that the intellect extracts the essence of the thing, rec-
ognizes what the thing is.
On the other hand, any attempt to explain mental rotation 
within the framework of Aristotelian cognitive psychology 
must run into serious problems. Insofar as zographema is 
indeed a two-dimensional representation, its geometrical 
relationship to the (shape of the) objects it represents is 
unclear in the Aristotelian account. For Aristotle, we have 
seen, the geometry of light does not provide a direct 
 (geometrical) connection between the object and its repre-
sentation. Consequently, if no geometrical account of visuo-
spatial representation is possible, it is unclear how the 
geometrical properties of objects can be preserved in the 
process of (mental) representation. And if they are not 
 preserved in representation, it is even less clear how they can 
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be articulated consistently in mental rotation. An even more 
fundamental problem is that, according to Aristotle, math-
ematical thinking is, ultimately, a job of the intellect—a stratum 
of the soul above the imagination. If mental rotation were to 
produce geometrically accurate results in the imagination, 
the imagination would have to follow the instructions it 
received from the intellect. In Aristotle’s cognitive scheme, 
however, the intellect extracts the essence of the thing from 
the phantasm, but there is no account of any (mathematical) 
feedback that it may provide to the imagination. It is conse-
quently not clear how imagination can solve the geometrical 
problems that arise from imagining a three-dimensional 
object from different sides in a series of two-dimensional 
phantasms.
Alberti does not have a solution for this problem, and, 
arguably, he does not need to have one. His treatises pertain 
to visual arts and architecture, not cognitive psychology. But 
his use of specific terms (and avoidance of others) shows that 
he was aware of the problem. The standard Aristotelian tech-
nical terms that could lead to the articulation of the problem, 
such as intellectus or imaginatio, do not appear once in the 
De re aedificatoria. Three crucial psychological terms, or 
mental capacities, are mentioned in this work: mens, animus, 
and ingenium.58 The last of these is the capacity for invention, 
the ability to create new things.59 Spatial thinking, including 
the ability to interpret two-dimensional perscriptiones three-
dimensionally, happens, Alberti says, in animo et mente.60 The 
two terms seem to be interchangeable in his writing.61 In 
the Aristotelian psychological tradition, animus and mens are 
the most general names for the rational capacities of the soul 
and pertain to the totality of the human rational soul. In the 
context of Alberti’s architectural treatise, animus refers to the 
cognitive soul in general—it is not limited to the intellect but 
also includes imagination, common sense, and memory. It 
thus comprises both the intellect and the lower, perishable, 
strata of the rational soul. Mens is used the same way, but not 
so often. The two terms are often used conjointly: Alberti 
says that we imagine buildings in animo et mente and that we 
can contemplate forms independent of matter in animo et 
mente.62 Alberti, one may surmise, was aware of the problem, 
and he avoided it by using the most general Aristotelian 
terms that refer to the rational soul, without committing 
himself to the particularities of the Aristotelian psychological 
account.
Epilogue
A discussion of the possibilities (or limits) of the use of geom-
etry in the representation of architectural works is ultimately 
a discussion about the nature of space and the nature of 
architectural works. Alberti articulated first (most directly in 
Elementa picturae, as mentioned) the important thesis that the 
content of every possible visual experience, seeing or imagin-
ing a thing, is quantifiable and geometrically describable. 
The principle seems obvious enough to us today—but we 
have seen that this was not necessarily always the case, and it 
was certainly not the case with Aristotle. Alberti’s principle 
that the totality of human visual experience is quantifiable is 
the fundamental assumption of architectural practice. This 
principle makes three-dimensional computer modeling soft-
ware possible. One can only try to imagine what architectural 
work would be like today if it were impossible to describe by 
means of geometry the shapes of buildings as one perceives 
them.
In other words, without Alberti’s principle, there would 
be no modern architectural practice. It should be noted, 
however, that the principle comes prepackaged with a strong 
claim on universality: everywhere where light rays are 
straight lines the geometry of human vision is going to be 
the same. As Alberti himself put it, parts of a sculpture can 
be reproduced at different places and subsequently put 
together as long as the system of measurement used is the 
same across the locations.63 Alberti’s theory of visual repre-
sentation relies on assumptions about space that Ernst 
 Cassirer and Erwin Panofsky have called homogeneity: it is 
a space in which geometry functions the same everywhere 
and in which it is possible to draw identical geometrical 
 figures in every direction.64 Since Panofsky suggested, almost 
a century ago, that the early Renaissance understanding of 
space as homogeneous enabled the discovery of the geo-
metrical construction of perspective, it has often been 
asserted that space was not conceived as homogeneous 
before the quattrocento. Some more radical authors have 
even suggested that we do not inhabit homogeneous space 
and that we are merely culturally conditioned to think that 
we do.65 Considering Cassirer’s and Panofsky’s definition of 
homogeneous space, such theses are hard to defend: in a non-
homogeneous space it is not possible to draw the same figure 
from every point in every direction. A figure can be a simple 
line (or a rectangle whose width is zero), and claiming that 
the people of the past could not have conceived of space as 
homogeneous boils down to saying that they did not assume 
that they could draw the same line from point A to point B 
and from B to A. Had architects started understanding space 
as homogeneous only in the Renaissance, before the Renais-
sance they would not have known that the length of a wall 
must be the same regardless of the end of the wall from which 
it is measured. This was not the case. What changed at the 
beginning of the Renaissance was not the understanding of 
space. Rather, the Italian urban environments of the era were 
characterized by close social interactions between artisans 
and intellectuals that made it possible for them to articulate 
dilemmas pertaining to visual representation as mathemati-
cal problems and resolve them in ways that were consistent 
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with geometrical knowledge available from many centuries 
earlier. Alberti’s and Brunelleschi’s great innovation was not 
the introduction of the assumption of the homogeneity of 
space but the systematic application of the geometrical 
nature of space to the problem of two-dimensional represen-
tation of three-dimensional objects. And it was an immensely 
influential innovation, judging by the way it dominates modern 
architectural practice.
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